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In its recently published Green Paper, the European Commission 2010 discusses various me-
thods to enhance the reliability of audits and to re-establish trust in the financial market. The 
Commission primarily focuses on increasing auditor independence and on reducing the high 
level of audit market concentration. Based on a model in the tradition of the circular market 
matching models introduced by Salop 1979, we show that prohibiting non-audit services as a 
measure intended to improve auditor independence can have counter-productive secondary 
effects on audit market concentration. In fact, our model demonstrates that incentives for in-
dependence and the structure of the audit market are simultaneously determined. Because 
market shares are endogenous in our model, it is not even clear that prohibiting non-audit ser-
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Ever since the recent global financial crisis brought to light the urgent need to stabilize the 
financial system, legislators around the world have begun to implement far-reaching measures 
to tighten the regulation of the banking sector. In addition, there has been vigorous debate 
about the respective roles of central banks, supervisory bodies, and rating agencies. With re-
gard to financial accounting, the discussion has mainly focused on the advantages and disad-
vantages of fair-value accounting in comparison to historical cost accounting. To date, the 
audit profession has not come under much fire, even though numerous financially distressed 
banks had received unqualified audit opinions.  
In a recently published Green Paper, however, the European Commission 2010 has shifted its 
attention towards the role of auditing. In particular, the Commission calls into question the 
adequacy of the current legislative framework and puts several proposals for enhancing the 
efficacy of auditing up for discussion. The aim of the proposed measures is to enhance the 
contribution of auditing in the process of re-establishing trust and market confidence, which 
would in turn increase the stability of the financial markets.  
The Commission primarily addresses two major issues: the independence of auditors and the 
structure of the audit market. To reinforce auditor independence, the Commission proposes 
several measures, including assigning the responsibility for appointing and remunerating an 
auditor to a third party rather than to the audited company itself, the mandatory rotation of 
audit firms, a limit on the proportion of fees an audit firm can earn from a single audit client 
in relation to its total audit revenues, and the reinforcement of rules that prevent auditors from 
offering non-audit services to their audit clients. With regard to the structure of the audit mar-
ket, the Commission recognizes that there are now only a handful of global audit firms able to 
perform audits on large, complex companies and financial institutions. The Commission pre-
dicts that the collapse of one of these “systemic” audit firms could potentially impair the sta-
bility of the financial system. Thus, the Commission recommends the mandatory formation of 
audit firm consortia in which at least one non-systemic audit firm is involved in auditing large 
clients, the mandatory rotation of audit firms to introduce more dynamism and capacity into 
the audit market, the mandatory re-tendering of mandates after a fixed period, and the reduc-
tion of barriers to market entry for small audit firms. The measures the Commission discusses 
are neither new nor completely convincing, and there has been prolonged discussion about the 
arguments put forward. Until now, however, the topics of “auditor independence” and “mar-
ket structure” have generally been discussed separately. 
In the following paper, we show that prohibiting non-audit services as a measure intended to 
improve auditor independence can have counter-productive secondary effects on audit market 
concentration. Our arguments are based on an audit market model in the tradition of the circu-
lar market matching models introduced by Schmalensee 1978 and Salop 1979. We distinguish 
between generalist audit firms that can provide consulting and audit services to both large and 
small clients, and small audit firms specialized in auditing small corporations. We assume 
that, compared to small audit firms, large audit firms have higher fixed costs and higher costs 
for planning the audit process. Small audit firms, in turn, have higher costs per unit of audit-
ing clients for which they are not perfectly specialized. We assume that knowledge spillovers 
flowing  from  non-audit  to  audit  services  reduce  the  costs  incurred  in  planning  the  audit 
process.  
Our results indicate that prohibiting the provision of non-audit services to audit clients has 
direct effects on the structure of the audit market. If there is no competition between large and 
small audit firms for small clients during the time before the prohibition becomes effective, a 
ban on providing consulting services to audit clients actually leads to a further increase in 
absolute market concentration (e.g., as measured by the concentration ratio). More precisely, 
we predict that the equilibrium number of large audit firms will decrease, because realizable total profits will decrease if the provision of non-audit services is prohibited. This effect on 
market structure is in direct contrast to the aims the Commission has outlined in its Green 
Paper. If, however, small and large audit firms effectively compete for small clients, our mod-
el predicts that a prohibition of consulting services would increase the number of small audit 
firms (because prohibiting large audit firms to offer non-audit services eliminates their cost 
advantages derived from knowledge spillovers and thus increases the small audit firms’ com-
petitiveness), but would still decrease the number of “systemic” suppliers. Thus, the effect 
that a prohibition of the joint supply of audit and non-audit services has on the equilibrium 
market structure depends on the cost structures of the small and large suppliers of audit ser-
vices, and on the degree of competition for small audit clients. Our results also show that reg-
ulatory reforms that address auditor independence cannot be discussed without taking their 
effects on market structure into account. 
The latter result is particularly important because the auditor’s incentive to remain indepen-
dent is determined by the economic importance of the respective client in comparison to the 
economic advantages the auditor derives from serving all other clients. Thus, independence is 
affected by the equilibrium number and size of audit firms, i.e., by the structure of the audit 
market. When we take the resulting equilibrium number of audit firms into account, we dem-
onstrate that the effect of prohibiting non-audit services on the independence of large audit 
firms is not straightforward: If we take the relation between the profit contribution an audit 
firm can earn from one single large client and the sum of the profit contributions from all oth-
er clients as a surrogate for auditor independence, prohibition naturally leads to a loss of the 
profit  contribution  earned  from  providing  consulting  services  (negative  consulting  effect), 
which should increase the auditor’s incentives to remain independent. However, the consult-
ing effect is partially offset by an increase in the profit contribution earned from auditing the 
large client (positive audit effect), which is caused by a decrease in the equilibrium number of 
large suppliers. Since the consulting effect exceeds the auditing effect, the net effect of the 
prohibition is negative, i.e., the large audit firm’s incentive to remain independent increases. 
But a large audit firm’s independence from a large client increases only if auditors that do not 
issue an unqualified opinion actually also lose the profit contribution derived from providing 
consulting services to that client; if we only look at the profit contribution from auditing, in-
dependence decreases as a result of the prohibition of non-audit services. Thus, our model 
shows that the assumption that prohibiting the joint supply of non-audit services improves 
auditor independence is at least questionable. 
The paper is organized into three sections. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature. Sec-
tion 3 presents our market matching model. In Section 4, we summarize our principal findings 
and derive conclusions regarding the Commission’s proposal for audit market regulation.  
 
 
2  Literature 
 
To date, only a few analytical papers have directly addressed the effects of the joint supply of 
audit and non-audit services. Beck/Wu 2006, for example, focus on the trade-off between 
audit fees and audit quality. They present a nonstrategic, dynamic Bayesian model to analyze 
audit quality, which is measured as the precision of the auditor’s posterior beliefs regarding 
client-specific characteristics. In their model, audit quality is affected by two components: 
Auditors learn from doing audits over time (learning effect), and auditors can perform non-
audit services that influence their  clients’ managerial decisions (business advisory  effect). 
Thus, providing non-audit services enables the auditor to anticipate changes in their clients’ 
business models. The results of Beck/Wu 2006 indicate that large professional fees can lead 
auditors to provide non-audit services that increase engagement risk and reduce audit quality.  DeAngelo 1981 has put forward a different definition of audit quality, viewing it as the mar-
ket-assessed joint probability that auditors will both discover and report material misstate-
ments in their clients’ accounting systems. Based on her model, DeAngelo 1981 argues that 
the ratio between the economic advantage auditors derive from one client (“quasi-rent”) and 
the sum of the economic advantages they earn from providing services to all of their clients is 
crucial for auditor independence. The provision of non-audit services can increase the profit 
contribution derived from one specific client, and thus increase the economic advantage audi-
tors put at risk if they deviate from an unqualified audit opinion. 
In line with this argument, Beck et al. 1988 presented a model to analyze the relationship be-
tween non-audit services and auditor independence. They showed that the provision of recur-
ring non-audit services that decrease the auditor’s start-up costs for auditing a client can de-
crease the quasi-rent derived from that particular client, and thus reduce the threat to auditor 
independence. Non-recurring non-audit services, however, are predicted to increase the client-
specific quasi-rent only  if knowledge spillovers reduce the ongoing costs for auditing the 
client.
1 Although Beck et al. 1988 offer a detailed explanation of the conditions that must be 
fulfilled for non-audit services to increase a client-specific quasi-rent, the authors do not ad-
dress the ratio of quasi-rents that is crucial for the potential impairment of auditor indepen-
dence, because neither the behavior of other clients nor the effect of allowing or prohibiting 
non-audit services on the auditors’ market shares is explicitly modeled. In the present paper, 
we analyze market shares and the equilibrium number of audit firms. Although our focus is 
not on auditor independence, based on our model the quasi-rent ratio (seen as an indicator for 
auditor independence) can be derived for situations in which providing consulting services is 
allowed, and compared to the ratio from a situation in which auditors do not perform non-
audit services. Thus, we are able to investigate whether a prohibition of the joint supply of 
audit and non-audit services indeed improves auditor independence. 
The idea of applying a market matching model to the audit market has also been presented in 
papers by Chan 1999 and Simons/Zein 2011. To model the auditors decisions regarding the 
level of audit quality they want to supply (i.e., quality-related audit market segmentation), 
Simons/Zein 2011 adopt a linear market matching model based on Hotelling 1929. An inter-
esting result of this paper is that improving the market position of mid-tier audit firms can 
lead  to  a  decrease  in  overall  audit  quality.  Chan  1999  uses  a  three-stage  variant  of  the 
Hotelling 1929 spatial-competition model, taking into account auditors’ start-up costs and 
thus  relationship-specific  economic  interests.  He  focuses  on  auditors’  decisions  regarding 
their specialization with respect to client characteristics and on the economic implications of 
low-balling. However, Chan 1999 and Simons/Zein 2011 do not address the effects of non-
audit services.  
 
 
3  A Model of the Audit Market 
 
3.1  Assumptions 
 
We use a circular market matching model inspired by Salop 1979 to analyze the interdepen-
dence between the joint supply of audit and consulting services and the structure of the audit 
market. We assume that the supply side of the audit market consists of two kinds of audit 
firms. In particular, we assume that there is a small number of large generalist audit firms, 
indexed  by  1, , = … i n,  and  a  large  number  of  small  specialized  audit  firms,  indexed  by 
1, , = j m … .  In line with empirical concentration studies,
2 we assume that there are more 
small audit firms than large ones.
3 Generalist audit firms employ a large number of audit staff 
with a variety of individual abilities and thus have a wide spectrum of professional knowledge 
at hand. In this way, large audit firms are able to provide a variety of audit and consulting services worldwide to all kinds of clients with varying audit-relevant characteristics. Specia-
lized audit firms, in contrast, have only a small number of audit staff, and consequently the 
range of their professional competencies is limited. Therefore, we assume that specialists can 
provide audit services but not consulting services to their clients. The results of our analysis 
would not change if we assumed that specialists could provide consulting services in addition 
to audit services (to small clients only). 
The demand side of our model is also made up of two groups, here based on the size of com-
panies to be audited: a large number of small clients and a small number of large clients. We 
assume that small clients only demand 1 unit of audit services each, whereas large clients buy 
1 > a  units of audit services in addition to 1 unit of consulting services.
4 Our results do not 
change qualitatively when all clients are assumed to demand consulting services. To simplify 
the analysis, we assume that large clients are restricted to buying audit and consulting services 
from the same supplier. Since we take into account knowledge spillovers from consulting to 
auditing and thus the cost savings arising from economies of scope, this demand behavior 
would also emerge endogenously. Particularly in the case of audit-related consulting services, 
the joint supply of the two services can also be observed in real-world business practice. 
Moreover, we assume that generalist audit firms do not compete with pure consulting firms to 
provide non-audit services.
5 
As in the model presented by Salop 1979, suppliers and consumers are uniformly distributed 
on a unit circle (see Figure 1). The position of a client on the circle describes the client’s audit 
and consulting-specific characteristics, such as its complexity (e.g., number of reports to be 
made, industry diversification, number of business areas, geographic dispersion of operations, 
corporate structure, listing status, and accounting standard in use) and its risk (e.g., financial 
position, management incentives regarding earnings management, and quality of the internal 
control system). With regard to the distribution of clients on the unit circle, we consider a 
continuous case. The mass of small clients is normalized to 1, and large clients have a mass of 
0 1 < < m . The position of an audit firm on the unit circle determines the correspondence be-
tween the audit firm’s specialization and the client’s characteristics. 
 
Figure 1: Audit firms and clients on the unit circle 
 
The cost structure of the audit firms is as follows: Every audit firm incurs some fixed costs 
that arise even if the audit firm does not provide services to any client. We assume the fixed 
costs of specialized audit firms, 
s
F c , to be lower than the fixed costs of generalist audit firms, 
l
F c , i.e.,  <
s l
F F c c . This assumption reflects the higher overhead costs of generalist audit firms 
employing a large number of audit staff.
6 These fixed costs can also be interpreted as a market 
entry barrier. 
In addition, audit firms incur some variable costs for auditing a certain client. We assume that 
an auditor’s variable costs consist of a component dependent on the client’s characteristics 
and of a component that is not affected by the client’s characteristics. 
Characteristic-independent audit costs reflect the costs associated with regulatory oversight 
of public company audits and the effort necessary to plan the audit process (e.g., expenses 
incurred to allocate audit staff to the audit firm’s various clients, costs arising from the deter-
mination of the scope of system audits and from auditing particular cases, and costs arising 
from the effort of estimating the clients’ inherent risk and control risk). In our model, charac-
teristic-independent audit costs thus occur even in a situation in which auditor and client are at 
the same spot on the unit circle. An audit firm’s cost for one unit of auditing a client with cha-
racteristics the auditor is perfectly specialized in is normalized to  0 0 >
l c  for generalist audit 
firms and to  0 0 =
s c  for specialized audit firms. The assumption  0 0 >
l s c c  reflects the fact that 
large audit firms simply have more staff that must be assigned to different tasks. In addition, we assume that large audit firms have higher reputational and litigation risks than small audit 
firms, and must therefore exert more effort in planning the audit than small audit firms do. 
Since we assume that only large audit firms can audit large (listed) clients, large audit firms 
face more restrictive requirements from regulatory oversight and must cope with more de-
manding accounting and auditing standards than small suppliers do. 
Characteristic-dependent audit costs, in contrast, are affected by the distance  x  between the 
audit firm and the client’s position on the unit circle.
7 As mentioned above, this distance 
represents the difference between a client’s characteristics and an auditor’s main focus regard-
ing these characteristics. Characteristic-dependent audit costs reflect the audit effort actually 
exerted in conducting the audit, given a certain predetermined level of assurance that clients’ 
financial statements are free from material misstatement. We assume that the characteristic-
dependent audit costs increase linearly with the distance  x .
8 Thus, the variable costs for au-
diting a small client located  x  units away from the audit firm are  0 + ×
l l
A c c x per unit of audit 
services for a generalist audit firm, and  ×
s
A c x for a specialized audit firm (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Characteristic-dependent costs for auditing a small client at location x 
 
Because  0 0 >
l s c c , small audit firms have an advantage in auditing small clients matching or 
close to their own specialization (i.e., for which there is only a small distance between audit 
firm and client on the unit circle). Generalist audit firms, in contrast, have an advantage in 
auditing small clients with characteristics they are not explicitly specialized in, because we 
assume that  <
l s
A A c c  holds (see Raghunandan et al. 2004). This cost relation accounts for the 
small audit firms’ specialization on the one hand and the broader competencies of large audit 
firms on the other. In addition, this relation takes into account the large audit firms’ capacity 
advantages, as their cost increase for auditing more clients is smaller than the cost increase for 
small audit firms. We do not, however, account for the possibility that providing services to 
clients with similar characteristics could lead to a reduction in fixed costs (e.g., as a result of 
the auditor’s industry specialization; see Cairney/Young 2006 and Hogan/Jeter 1999). 
We assume that only large audit firms have the capacities necessary to audit large clients.
9 
The variable costs for auditing a large client at distance  x  are thus given by  0 ( ) × + ×
l l
A c c x a , 
as these clients demand a  units of audit services. 
For providing audit services, an arbitrary large or small audit firm  , a i j =  demands an audit 
fee denoted by  ( )
a
A fee x . Thus, we allow for price discrimination based on the distance be-
tween client and audit firm. We do not explicitly model the empirical result that large audit 
firms, because of higher audit quality in comparison to small suppliers, better reputation, or a 
“deep pockets mentality”, charge higher audit fees than small suppliers, ceteris paribus (see 
the  meta-analysis  conducted  by  Hay  et  al.  2006).  However,  inclusion  of  “Big  X”  price-
premiums that are fixed across clients would not alter our results, since additional fixed-fee 
components could be regarded as a reduction in the characteristic-independent variable audit 
costs. 
In addition to audit services, each large client is assumed to also demand 1 unit of consulting 
services. As with the audit costs, we assume that a large audit firm’s consulting costs depend 
on the locations of the audit firm and the client on the unit circle. An audit firm’s costs for 
providing consulting services to a client located at the same spot on the unit circle are norma-
lized to 0. We denote the consulting costs for a client located  x  units away from the audit 
firm by  × C c x. If audit and consulting services are provided by the same audit firm, we refer to 
the combined fee an arbitrary large audit firm i charges a large client as 
i
Al C fee + .  Large audit firms naturally earn additional profits from providing consulting services, which 
are evidently more profitable than audit services. In line with the arguments against the prohi-
bition of the joint supply of audit and consulting services put forward by the auditing profes-
sion, we assume that offering consulting services additionally reduces audit costs. More spe-
cifically, we assume that knowledge spillovers from consulting to auditing decrease the cha-
racteristic-independent audit costs. In particular, we assume that the audit firm receives in-
formation about its client’s business in the course of providing consulting services, and that 
this information eases the planning of the audit process (e.g., because the auditor learns about 
the actual inherent risk and the control risk of the client; see Beck/Wu 2006). If an audit firm 
provides consulting services for a large client located  x units away from its own location, 
audit costs per unit of audit services are thus reduced to  0 × + ×
l l
A c c x g , with 0 1 < < g . 
The question of whether knowledge spillovers actually exist has received a great deal of atten-
tion in the empirical accounting literature. Most of the studies using a single-equation model 
with audit fees as a dependent and non-audit fees as an independent variable have obtained a 
positive relationship between non-audit fees and audit fees,
10 which could either be the result 
of knowledge spillovers or of systematic differences between clients purchasing non-audit 
services and clients receiving audit services only. Tests based on audit fees, however, rely on 
the assumption that services are billed consistently with the “physical flow of knowledge” 
(Simunic 1984, p. 685), so the results of these studies might be contaminated by pricing poli-
cies and cross-subsidization between services.
11 Since non-audit fees could be endogenous in 
the audit fee regression, an econometric test using single-equation models with audit fees 
(non-audit fees) as a dependent (independent) variable can result in biased coefficients. Thus, 
the significantly positive association between audit and non-audit fees documented in the lite-
rature could be the result of biased or inconsistent estimation of the non-audit fee coefficient 
induced by the use of endogenous variables in single-equation models. Whisenant et al. 2003 
found that characteristics of clients, auditors, and the auditor-client relationship simultaneous-
ly determine audit and non-audit fees.
12 In particular, Whisenant et al. 2003 were unable to 
detect a significant association between audit and non-audit fees using a simultaneous specifi-
cation of the audit and non-audit fee system.
13 One major additional problem in obtaining 
empirical evidence for economies of scope seems to be the specification of the non-audit fee 
model, since we do not have a good theoretical understanding of the production of consulting 
services, nor do we have sufficiently powerful instruments to estimate audit and non-audit 
fees. However, an adequate definition of the non-audit fee equation is particularly crucial if a 
simultaneous-equations specification is applied. 
 
3.2  Reference Situation I: A Market Consisting of Specialized Audit Firms Only 
 
As a starting point, we consider a market that consists solely of a constant number m of small 
audit firms. By assumption, potential clients of the specialized audit firms must stem from the 
group of small clients that demand 1 unit of audit services each. 
To derive the audit fees and an arbitrary audit firm’s number of clients, we consider a random 
pair of similar audit firms. The similarity of these two suppliers is given by their smallest 
possible distance 1 m on the unit circle. Assume that  x  is some point on the unit circle lo-
cated between audit firms  j  and  1 - j  (i.e., we define  x  to lie between 0 and 1/ m  units 
away from audit firm  j ). A client is willing to buy audit services from a supplier  j  located 
x  units away on the unit circle instead of from the second-nearest supplier  1 j -  located 
1 m x -  units away only if the requested fee of audit firm  j ,  ( )
j
A fee x , is smaller than the fee 
of  audit  firm  1 j - , 
1(1 )
j
A fee m x
- - .  Thus,  audit  firm  j   wins  the  audit  contract  only  if 
1 ( ) (1 )
j j
A A fee x fee m x
- £ - . However, it would only be profitable for audit firm  j  to accept a client at location  x  if the fee charged were higher than or equal to the corresponding audit 
costs, i.e., if  ( )³ ×
j s
A A fee x c x, or, equivalently, if  ( ) £
j s
A A x fee x c . Analogously, it is profit-




A A fee m x c m x
- - ³ × - , or if ( )
1 1 (1 )
j s
A A m x fee m x c
- - £ - . Figure 3 graphs the costs 
for auditing an arbitrary small client in between two small audit firms. 
 
Figure 3: Costs for auditing an arbitrary small client in between two small audit firms 
 
In our model, the two audit firms compete for a client in a Bertrand competition by undercut-
ting each other’s audit fees. Thus, a client at position  x¢ will accept an audit contract with 
audit firm  j  instead of a contract with audit firm  1 j -  only if 
1 ( ') (1 ')
j j
A A fee x fee m x
- £ -  or if 
( ) 1
s s
A A c x c m x ¢ ¢ × £ × -  (i.e., if  1/ ' x m x ¢ £ - , so the client is closer to audit firm  j  than to 
audit firm  1 j - ). Thus, audit firm  j  can set its audit fee to  ( ) ( ) 1
j s
A A fee x c m x ¢ ¢ = × - , which 
is the last competitive fee offer of audit firm  1 j - . Similarly, for a client located closer to 
audit firm  1 j -  than to audit firm  j  at  x¢¢, so that  ( ) 1
s s
A A c x c m x ¢¢ ¢¢ × ³ × -  holds (i.e.,  ¢¢ ³ x  




A fee m x   ¢¢ = ×
s
A c x . 
The threshold for the apportionment of clients located in between two audit firms on the unit 
circle is found at location  1/2 = x m , as the two audit firms’ costs for auditing a small client 
are identical at this spot, i.e.,  ( ) 1 × = × -
s s
A A c x c m x . At this point exactly between the two 
audit firms, the audit fee is  ( ) ( )
1 / 2 1
- = = -
j s j
A A A fee x c m fee m x . Since we assume a conti-
nuous number of clients, we do not have to determine which of the two audit firms wins the 
audit contract with the client located exactly at point  x . 
The maximum audit fee an audit firm  j  can charge is the fee that the client located at the 
same spot on the unit circle as audit firm  j  is willing to accept. The audit fee for this client is 
determined by the costs of the second-nearest audit firm  1 j -  (at a distance of 1 m units) and 
is given by  ( ) 0 / =
j s
A A fee c m. As this reasoning holds for both directions on the unit circle, 
audit firm  j ’s revenues from providing audit services to small clients, given a certain number 






2 2 2 2 2
s s s s
j A A A A
A
c c c c
m m m m m
    ×
P = × × + - =    
   
. 
Figure 4 depicts these revenues graphically. 
 
Figure 4: Small audit firms’ revenues from providing audit services 
 
In our model, every small client gets an audit contract. The restriction  ( ) £
j s
A A x fee x c  for an 
audit contract to be profitable is always fulfilled, since the threshold company located 1 2m 
units away from the two nearest audit firms on the unit circle is charged an audit fee of 
(1/ 2 ) 2 =
j s
A A fee m c m.  Thus,  the  profitability  restriction  1 2 £ m   ( 2 )/ 1 2 =
s s
A A c m c m  is 
always fulfilled. In addition, none of the audit firms has monopoly power at their spot on the 




A A fee m c m
- = . Thus, the audit firm located at the same spot as a client cannot 
charge a monopoly fee exceeding the costs of audit firm  1 - j . To calculate the profit contribution resulting from the provision of audit services, we must 
subtract the variable costs (i.e., the characteristic-independent costs, which are normalized to 
0 0 =
s c  for small audit firms, and the characteristic-dependent costs 
s
A c x × ) from the reve-
nues. The characteristic-dependent costs for a client located at the same spot on the unit circle 
as the audit firm are 0. The costs for auditing  the client at the greatest possible distance 
(1 2 ) m  would be  2
s
A c m. The calculation of the characteristic-dependent audit costs 
j
A C  of a 













= × × = . 
The profit contribution audit firm  j  earns can thus be calculated as 
(3) 
2 2
= P - =
s






An illustration of this profit contribution can be found in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Small audit firms’ profit contribution earned from providing audit services 
 
To derive the equilibrium number of small audit firms in a market without large suppliers, we 
must take the fixed costs 
s
F c  into account. If we abstract from additional market entry bar-
riers, audit firms will enter the market if they can earn positive profits, i.e., if  0
j s
A F c p - > . If 
profits are negative, small audit firms will drop out. Thus, in market equilibrium, the condi-
tion  0
j s
A F c p - =  or 
2 / 2 =
s s
A F c m c  must be fulfilled. The equilibrium number 
* m  of small 















Obviously, the equilibrium number of small audit firms decreases with the fixed costs 
s
F c , 
and increases with the characteristic-dependent audit costs per unit of “distance”  x , 
s
A c . 
 
3.3  Reference Situation II: A Market Consisting of Generalist Audit Firms Only 
 
3.4.1  Large Audit Firms Provide Only Audit Services 
 
In the following section, we consider a situation in which the audit market consists only of n  
large audit firms. Large audit firms differ from small suppliers in two audit-related aspects: 
First, only large audit firms are capable of auditing large clients. Second, compared to specia-
lized audit firms, large audit firms have an advantage regarding characteristic-dependent audit 
costs per unit of “distance”  x  (because  <
l s
A A c c ), but operate at a disadvantage in terms of 
characteristic-independent audit costs ( 0 0 0
l s c c > = ). In the first step, we assume that large 
audit firms provide audit services but not consulting services. 
Analogous to the analysis of an audit market consisting purely of small audit firms, we con-
sider two similar large audit firms, i and  1 i - . We assume that  x  is some point on the unit 
circle that lies between audit firms i and  1 i - . Taking the positive characteristic-independent 
audit costs  0
l c  of a large audit firm into account, it is profitable for audit firm  i to audit a 
(small or large) client located  x  units away only if  ( ) 0
i l l
A A fee x c c x ³ + × . For the second-




A A fee n x c c n x
- - ³ + × - . Thus, audit firm i rather than audit firm  1 i -  
will audit a client at position  x¢ if  ( ) 0 0 1
l l l l
A A c c x c c n x ¢ ¢ + × £ + × - , i.e., if audit firm i is clos-
er to that client than audit firm  1 i -  is ( 1 x n x ¢ ¢ £ - ). For this client, audit firm i can charge 
an audit fee of  ( ) ( ) 0 1
i l l
A A fee x c c n x ¢ ¢ = + × - . If, in contrast, a client is located  x¢¢ units away 




A fee n x  
0 ¢¢ = + ×
l l
A c c x , because  ( ) 0 0 1
l l l l
A A c c x c c n x ¢¢ ¢¢ + × ³ + × - . 
As in the case of a market consisting solely of small audit firms, the threshold for the division 
of clients between two large audit firms is given by  1 2 x n = . The audit fee for small clients 
located at this point is given by  ( ) 0 2
i l l
A A fee x c c n = + , and again the fee charged for a client 
situated at exactly the same spot as the audit firm is  ( ) 0 0
i l l
A A fee c c n = + . These arguments 




0 0 0 2
3 1 1
2
2 2 2 2 2
l l l l l
i l l l A A A A
As
c c c c c
c c c
n n n n n n
        ×
P = × × + + + - + = +        
         
. 
Considering the large clients’ demand for auditing a  as well as their mass  m  results in the 
revenue an arbitrary large audit firm i can earn from auditing large clients: 

















Again, every client gets an audit contract, and no audit firm can exercise monopoly power. 
Summing up both partial revenues yields the large audit firm  i’s revenues from providing 
audit services: 


















To calculate the profit contribution of auditing, variable costs (i.e.,  0 0
l c >  and 
l
A c x × ) must be 
subtracted from the revenues. The costs for auditing the clients at the smallest and the largest 
distance on the unit circle are  0
l c  and  0 2
l l
A c c n + , respectively. Thus, the variable costs of a 
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l l l
i l l l A A
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In sum, the variable costs of audit firm i are 

















Subtracting the variable audit costs from the revenues results in the profit contribution of a 
large audit firm i: 
(10)  ( ) 2 1
2
= P - = + × ×
l





p m a . 
The equilibrium number of suppliers in a market consisting only of large audit firms that do 
not provide consulting services is given by (11)  ( )
* 1
2









m a . 
Similar to the situation of a market of small audit firms, the equilibrium number of large audit 
firms increases with the characteristic-dependent costs 
l
A c , and decreases with the fixed costs 
l
F c . In addition, the equilibrium number of large audit firms increases with the mass of large 
clients,  m , and their demand for auditing, a . The characteristic-independent costs  0
l c  have 
no effect on the equilibrium number of audit firms, since they are identical across audit firms 
and fully shifted to the clients. 
In the beginning, we assumed that there were more specialized audit firms than generalists. 
Comparison of our results for the separate markets (equations (4) and (11)) indicates that this 
assumption can also evolve endogenously. The condition 
* * m n >  is fulfilled if the ratio be-
tween characteristic-dependent audit costs and fixed audit costs for specialized audit firms is 
larger than the respective weighted cost ratio for generalists: 







m a + × ×
> . 
The above inequality holds if the small audit firms’ characteristic-dependent costs 
s
A c  (fixed 
audit costs 
s
F c ) are relatively high (low), and if the large audit firms’ characteristic-dependent 
costs 
l
A c  (fixed audit costs 
l
F c ) are relatively low (high). These conditions are in line with 
our initial assumptions  <
s l
F F c c  and  >
s l
A A c c . In addition, inequality (12) – necessary for 
* * m n >  to hold – requires that this cost effect not be offset by a comparatively large number 
of large clients, m , or by an excessive demand for audit services, a . 
 
3.4.2  Large Audit Firms Provide Consulting Services To Their Audit Clients 
 
In contrast to the preceding section, we now consider a situation in which generalist audit 
firms can also provide consulting services to their large audit clients. We assume that consult-
ing services create spillover effects on the costs incurred for audits of large clients, i.e., the 
characteristic-independent audit costs for large clients who buy consulting services are re-
duced to  0 ( ) × × + ×
l l
A c c x a g . The costs for auditing small clients, however, are assumed to be 
unaffected, since small clients do not demand consulting services in our model. 
As before, the consulting costs for a client located  x  units away from the audit firm are  . × C c x  
Given these assumptions, the respective fees a client at the threshold  1 2 = x n and a client 
located at the same spot as the audit firm must pay to receive audit and consulting services 
from audit firm i are given by 
(13)  ( ) ( ) 0 1/2 2 2 + = × × + +
i l l
Al C A C fee n c c n c n a g  and 
( ) ( ) 0 0
i l l
Al C A C fee c c n c n a g + = × × + + . 
From providing auditing and consulting services to large clients, audit firm i earns revenues 
of  
(14)  ( )












m a m +
  × × ×




The costs for providing auditing and consulting services for large clients are (15)  ( )
















m a m  
and the profit contribution from providing auditing and consulting services to large clients is  
(16)  ( ) 2 2 .
2 2
+ + + = P - = × × + ×
l
i i i C A




p m a m  





= P - =
l






The total profit contribution of a large audit firm thus is given by 
(18)  ( ) 2 2 1
2 2
+ + = + = + × × + ×
l
i i i C A
A C Al C As
c c
n n
p p p m a m . 
The  equilibrium  number  of  large  audit  firms  follows  from  the  zero-profit  condition 
( ) + =
i l
A C F c p : 










m a m + = + × × + ×
× ×
 
Thus, in comparison to a situation in which the joint supply of audit and consulting services is 
prohibited, the equilibrium number of large audit firms is strictly larger if generalists can also 
provide consulting services to large clients, i.e., 
*
A C A n n
*
+ >  (see equation (11)). The reason-
ing behind this result is that consulting services are quite profitable for audit firms.
15 The ad-
ditional direct profit contribution 
2 ( /2 ) = ×
i
C C c n p m  earned from consulting services attracts 
more suppliers to enter the market, i.e., the number of audit firms increases. Interestingly, the 
fact that knowledge spillovers reduce the  characteristic-independent costs  0
l c  for auditing 
large clients has no effect on the equilibrium number of audit firms, since these costs are fully 
shifted to the clients. 
We can derive qualitatively similar results if we assume that providing consulting services for 
a large client also reduces the costs for auditing a small client located at the same spot as the 
large client. However, we must consider the fact that the profit contribution realizable for 
small clients affects the last fee offer an audit firm is willing to accept in order to secure an 
audit and consulting contract with a large client. Specifically, it might be profitable to make a 
fee offer below actual costs for providing services to large clients. Because of spillover ef-
fects, this pricing strategy can yield a profitable contract with a small client at the same spot. 
Not surprisingly, we find that the profit contribution derived in this scenario is even larger 
than in the case in which only the audit costs of the large client actually buying consulting 
services are reduced. The optimal number of audit firms increases with the profit contribution, 
because fixed costs are assumed to be constant across the scenarios we consider. Thus, the 
equilibrium number of generalist audit firms is larger in the case of knowledge spillovers also 
to small clients, as compared to a situation in which consulting services reduce only the costs 
for auditing the client actually buying the consulting services.  
To sum up, large audit firms can increase their profit contribution from auditing by providing 
consulting services, which increases the equilibrium number of audit firms. Therefore, prohi-
biting the joint supply of audit and non-audit services reduces audit firms’ profit contribu-
tions, and thus reduces the optimal number of suppliers. Our result thus has important policy 
implications for a market in which only generalist audit firms are present. 
Concentration studies show that the market segment of listed companies of some national 
audit markets are indeed characterized by a situation in which (almost) exclusively large audit 
firms  are  present.  The  European  Commission  considers  auditors  of  internationally  listed firms, and notably of financial institutions, as “systemic”; maintaining the number of “system-
ic”  audit  firms,  in  turn,  is  one  of  the  major  objectives  the  Commission  seeks  to  achieve 
through the implementation of the measures outlined in its Green Paper. If, however, the joint 
provision of audit and consulting services is abolished in the market setting we have just ana-
lyzed, our model predicts a decrease in the number of large audit firms. Thus, the Commis-
sion’s goals of decreasing audit market concentration and of improving auditor independence 
interact.
16 The prohibition of the joint supply of audit and consulting services therefore might 
be counter-productive if a high level of market concentration (defined as a low number of 
suppliers active in a market segment, or a high value of the concentration ratio) is viewed as 
undesirable.  
In addition, it is not clear whether a prohibition of the joint supply of auditing and consulting 
indeed strengthens an auditor’s incentives to remain independent. The ratio between the profit 
contribution a generalist audit firm earns from auditing (and consulting) one specific client, 
( )
i pc x , to the total profit contribution  ( *)
i n p  a generalist can realize can be considered an 
indicator for auditor independence. Since this ratio’s maximum value is obtained for a client 
located at exactly the same spot as the audit firm, we focus on  ( ) (0) 0 / ( *) =
i i r pc n p . Since 
the zero-profit condition  ( *)
i l
F n c p =  must be fulfilled,  ( *)
i n p  remains constant across our 
scenarios if we take into account the optimal number of audit firms. Thus, only the client-
specific profit contribution  ( ) 0
i pc  is relevant. Assuming that knowledge spillovers only af-
fect the large client actually buying consulting services, the profit contribution derived from 
auditing the most profitable small client,  ( ) 0
i pc , is given by  
(20)  ( ) 0 0 0 * *. = + - =
i l l l l
As A A pc c c n c c n   
Prohibiting non-audit services would lead to a decrease in the optimal number of large sup-
pliers, which would increase the individual profit contribution  ( ) 0
i
As pc , i.e., weaken the au-
ditor’s incentive to remain independent. 
For the most profitable large client, however, the profit contributions from auditing (and con-

























=  if only auditing is allowed. 
Here, prohibition of non-audit services  would  eliminate the second term in equation  (21) 
(negative consulting effect), which would, of course, strengthen auditor independence; never-
theless, the first term in (22) is larger than in (21), since  * * + < A A C n n , i.e., the profit contribu-
tion derived from auditing the most profitable large client is higher if only auditing services 
are provided, as compared to a situation in which the joint supply of the two services is al-
lowed (positive audit effect). Thus, the effect of a prohibition of non-audit services on auditor 
independence depends on whether auditors who do not issue an unqualified audit opinion on a 
client’s financial statements also lose the associated consulting contract. If this is the case, a 
prohibition increases independence from large clients, since  (0) (0) + >
i i
Al C Al pc pc  holds. If, in 
contrast, only the audit contract is lost, a prohibition decreases auditor independence.
17 Thus, 
there might be counter-productive secondary effects on auditor independence from small (and 
possibly also large) clients if we take the effects on the market structure into account. 
 3.4.3  Large Audit Firms Provide Consulting Services, But Not To Their Audit Clients 
 
In the preceding section, we have shown that a prohibition of the joint supply of audit and 
consulting services is predicted to decrease the equilibrium number of large audit firms. One 
argument against a decrease in the number of suppliers is that audit firms might circumvent 
the loss of profitable consulting contracts by providing non-audit services to companies other 
than their audit clients. Figure 6 illustrates the reasoning we apply to derive a large audit 
firm’s resulting profit contribution. 
 
Figure 6: Large audit firms’ profit contribution earned from providing audit and 
consulting services to various clients 
 
Assume that audit firm i provides consulting services to the clients the audit firm is specia-
lized in, i.e., to clients within a distance of  1 2 £ x n  on both sides of the unit circle. As a re-
sult of the prohibition, audit firm  i does not audit clients in this region, but only clients at 
distance  1 2 > x n. Audit firm i therefore competes with audit firm  2 i-  ( 2 i+ ) for audit con-
tracts with clients at distance  1 2 > x n to the “left” (“right”) of audit firm  i; because audit 
firm  1 - i   ( 1) + i  provides consulting services to these clients,  1 - i  ( 1 + i ) is not allowed to 
compete for audit contracts in this region. 
The  costs  audit  firm  i  incurs  by  auditing  clients  at  distance  1 2n   (1 n)  are  given  by 
0 ( / 2 ) × +
l l
A c c n a  ( 0 ( / ) × +
l l
A c c n a ), since there are no knowledge spillovers from consulting 
for one client to auditing a different client. The audit costs of competitor  2 i-  ( 2 + i ) deter-
mine the fee audit firm i can charge: 
(23)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 1 2 3 2
i l l
A A fee n c c n a = × + ×  and 
( ) ( ) 0 1 . = × +
i l l
A A fee n c c n a  
Thus, the profit contribution for auditing clients at distances of 1 2 1/ < £ n x n is the same as 
in the case without consulting, i.e.,  







p m a . 
Since the total profit contribution from auditing and consulting is unaffected by the prohibi-
tion against the joint supply of the two services if audit firms re-arrange their audit and con-
sulting contracts, the equilibrium number of audit firms is the same as in the case in which 
audit firms are allowed to provide both services to their clients. Audit fees, however, increase 
due to the prohibition by  ( ) 2
l
A c n a × , on average.
18  
 
3.4  A Joint Market Consisting of Specialized And Generalist Audit Firms 
 
3.4.1  Motivation 
 
Up to this point, we have investigated two different partial markets consisting of either only 
small or only large audit firms. The assumption of segmented audit markets has practical re-
levance for national audit markets that are characterized by high values of the concentration 
ratio. Simplistically, these markets can be divided into a group of large audit firms providing 
audit (and non-audit) services primarily to large corporations and a group of small suppliers 
providing audit services predominantly to small clients.
19 For other audit markets, however, 
the allocation of clients among audit firm types is less clear-cut. In less concentrated markets, 
there might be competition between large and small audit firms, at least for smaller listed cor-porations or for larger unlisted firms.
20 In the next step of our analysis, we thus investigate a 
joint audit market consisting of both large and small audit firms. As above, small audit firms 
are assumed to audit small clients only. Thus, in our model there is competition for small 
clients between the two types of audit firms; for auditing and consulting services for large 
clients, however, there is competition only within the group of large suppliers.  
 
3.4.2  Large Audit Firms Do Not Compete Against Small Audit Firms For Providing Audit 
Services To Small Clients 
 
In the first step, we assume that – prior to the prohibition against providing both kinds of ser-
vices to audit clients – large audit firms cannot effectively compete against small audit firms, 
because  their  characteristic-independent  audit  costs  are  large  compared  to  those  of  their 
smaller competitors. Moreover, we assume that providing consulting services only affects the 
costs for auditing the client actually buying consulting services. Thus, we assume that the 
market is effectively separated into large and small suppliers. 
In the reference situation with only small audit firms, the highest fee a specialized audit firm 
could charge was the fee for auditing a small client located at exactly the same spot on the 
unit circle, i.e.,  ( ) 0 * =
j s
A A fee c m . Inserting the equilibrium number of firms 
* m  (see equa-
tion (4)) leads to  ( ) 0 2 = × ×
j s s
A A F fee c c . If the small audit firm’s maximum fee is lower than 
an arbitrary large audit firm  i’s minimum costs incurred for auditing a  small client (i.e., 
( ) 0 0
i l
As c c = ), no large audit firm would win an audit contract with a small client. If condition 
0 2
l s s
A F c c c > × ×  is fulfilled, the 
* m  specialized audit firms would provide audit services to 
all  of  the  small  clients,  charging  an  average  audit  fee  of 
* (3/4) ( / ) = ×
s
As A fee c m  
3 4 2 = × × ×
s s
F A c c . This average audit fee equals the total audit fees small clients pay, since 
the mass of small clients is normalized to 1. 
Prohibiting the joint supply of audit and consulting services in this scenario can only affect 
the market segment of large firms. The equilibrium number of large audit firms would de-










m a m + = × × + ×
× ×










m a = × ×
×
. The derivation of the 
equilibrium number of large audit firms is analogous to that for equations (11) and (19), tak-
ing into account that the large audit firms do not audit small clients (the index  Al  indicates 
that solely large clients are audited). In our model, a decrease in the number of large audit 
firms is equivalent to an increase in absolute market concentration, since the number of small 
audit firms remains constant. This effect is exactly the opposite of what the European Com-
mission had envisioned for the strategy of prohibiting consulting services. 
The average fee large clients have to pay for the combined services of auditing and consulting 
is  0 0
3 3
3 4 2 1
4 4
l
l l l l C A
Al C F A C
Al C Al C
c c
fee c c c c c
n n
a g g a a m m + * *
+ +
  × ×
= × × + + = × × + × × × × + ×  
 
,  whe-















0 3 4 2 × + × × × ×
l l l
F A c c c a a m . In line with the arguments put forward by the auditing profes-
sion (and their clients), average audit fees would thus increase, at least for large clients (we 
compare the fee component related to audit services, i.e., the first term in the average com-
bined fee,  Al C fee + , in the case in which consulting is allowed, with the average audit fee after the prohibition of consulting services is enacted,  Al fee ). The total fees paid in the two cases 
are  Al C fee m + ×  and  Al fee m × . To compare the total fee paid in the two scenarios, one could 
assume a separate market for consulting services for the case in which audit firms are not al-
lowed to provide consulting services to their audit clients. If we stick to the same linear con-
sulting cost pattern as in the preceding analysis, there would be an equilibrium number of 














F c  are the fixed costs and 
C
C c  the characteristic-
dependent costs of firms offering consulting services only. Average consulting fees would be 
*
3










= = × × × × .  It  becomes  clear  that  whether  the  overall  fee  paid 
increases or decreases is dependent on the cost structure of firms offering only consulting 
services. If we assume that consulting firms’ fixed costs and characteristic-dependent costs 
are comparable to those of audit firms, i.e., 
C l
F F c c »  and 
C
C C c c » , consulting fees would 
also increase as a result of the prohibition on providing combined services.
21 Remember that 
we have assumed that non-audit services are supplied by large audit firms only, i.e., there are 
no consulting firms. Thus, we can assume that firms offering only consulting services would 
have higher costs than audit firms, and thus there would be a cost increase for auditing as a 
result of the prohibition against the joint supply of audit and non-audit services. 
To sum up, the prohibition against consulting services reduces the number of large audit firms 
and increases the audit fees large clients have to pay, but does not affect competition among 
small audit firms. This result for the joint market is analogous to the comparison based on 
separate markets,
22 and is not surprising, since the markets are effectively separated due to the 
higher costs large audit firms incur. Separation would, however, also evolve endogenously 
and not simply by assumption. We investigate the more interesting case of a joint audit mar-
ket in the next section. 
 
3.4.3  There Is Competition Between Large And Small Audit Firms For Providing Audit 
Services To Small Clients  
 
In this section, we assume parameter constellations that ensure competition between large and 
small audit firms for small clients during the time period before the prohibition on supplying 
both services goes into effect. First, for a given number of audit firms, we derive the number 
of clients that audit firms can contract with and the audit fees paid in the cases with and with-
out consulting (short-term effect). As there is no direct short-term effect of prohibiting con-
sulting services on the market for auditing small clients (if consulting only affects the costs 
for auditing clients actually receiving consulting services), we assume in the following analy-
sis that there are knowledge spillovers also to similar small clients. Second, we investigate 
how the equilibrium number of audit firms changes, i.e., how a prohibition on consulting ser-
vices affects market structure in the long run.  
We assume an initial market with a number of large audit firms  n  and small audit firms m. 
In addition, we presume that both large and small audit firms are uniformly distributed on the 
unit circle. Thus, the distance between an arbitrary large audit firm  i and the nearest large 
audit firm  1 i -  is again 1 n, and the distance between two small audit firms is  1/ m . The 
small audit firm with the shortest distance to the large audit firm i in one direction of the unit 
circle is located somewhere between the two extreme distances 0 and 1 m. A distance of 0 
means that the nearest small audit firm is located at exactly the same spot on the unit circle as 
audit firm i, and thus the second-nearest small audit firm’s position on the unit circle is at a 
distance of 1 m. A distance of 1 2m means that the large audit firm  i is located exactly in between two small audit firms. A distance of slightly less than 1 m means that on one side of 
the unit circle, the next small audit firm’s position is only very slightly shifted from the large 
audit firm’s location, so that the distance to the next firm on the other side of the circle is 
nearly 1 m. We label the distance between the large audit firm i and the nearest small audit 
firm  j  as d  (0 1 ) £ < d m . 
Due to reasons of symmetry, large audit firms get audit and consulting contracts with large 
clients within a distance of 1 2n  in each direction of the unit circle. Within this distance, cha-
racteristic-independent costs for both large and small clients are given by  0
l c g ×  per unit of 
audit service. 
The lowest audit fee a specialized audit firm can charge if it effectively competes with the 
nearest  small  audit  firm  applies  to  a  small  client  located  at  a  distance  of  1 2m,  i.e., 
( ) 1 2 2
j s
A A fee m c m = . If  0 2
l s
A c c m <  holds (e.g., if the costs a large audit firm incurs for 
auditing a client located at exactly the same spot are lower than the audit fee the small audit 
firm at the largest possible distance 1 2m charges), large audit firms can win audit contracts 
with small clients, even if consulting services are prohibited. If we make the more restrictive 
assumption  0 2 2
l l s
A A c c n c m + < , we can ensure that small audit firms always compete with 
their nearest large audit firm. Thus, in the following analysis we consider a situation in which 
the prohibition of consulting services does not lead to separation of the joint market of small 
and large audit firms. If, however, knowledge spillovers from consulting are very high, i.e., g  
is very low, a prohibition on consulting could lead to separate audit markets for large and 
small clients (see Figure 7). For this effect to occur, the conditions  0 2 2
l l s
A A c c n c m g × + <  
and  0 2
l s
A c c m >  must be fulfilled. 
 
Figure 7: Cost structures of small and large audit firms if a prohibition on providing 
consulting services leads to separation of the audit markets 
 
With consulting, the costs of the large audit firm i to audit a small client at exactly the same 
spot on the unit circle are given by  ( ) 0 0
i l
As c c g = × , whereas the nearest large competitor’s 




As A c n c c n
- = + . These costs are always larger than i’s costs. The costs 
of the nearest small audit firm  j  are  ( )
j s
As A c d c d = × . Audit firm i effectively competes with 
audit firm  j  for the audit contract with the small client located at exactly the same spot as 
audit firm i if  0 /
s l l
A A c d c c n × < + . Otherwise, i competes with the nearest other large audit 
firm  1 j +  (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Cost structures of small and large audit firms 
 
If  ( ) ( ) 0 0
i l s j
As A As c c c d c d g = × < × = , the large audit firm  i wins the contract with the small 
client  at  exactly  the  same  spot  as  audit  firm  i  and  can  charge  a  fee  of 
{ } 0 min ; . × +
s l l
A A c d c c n  Given the assumption  0 2
s l l
A A c d c c n × < + , the large audit firm i can 
charge an audit fee of  ( ) 0
i s
A fee c d = ×  to the client at the same spot on the unit circle.
23  
The threshold at which the large audit firm  i’s costs are higher than the costs of the small 
audit firm  j  can be derived from 
0 0 0 0
0 ( ) ( ) ( ) = × + × ³ × - = -
i l l s j
As A A As c x c c x c d x c d x g , i.e., 
0
0 ( )/( ) ³ × - × +
s l s l
A A A x c d c c c g . If the distance between the large audit firm i and a potential client exceeds this threshold, the nearest small audit firm  j  wins the contract with the small 
client and can charge the large audit firm i’s costs as an audit fee. The threshold at which the 
large audit firm  i’s costs are lower than the small audit firm  j ’s costs can similarly be de-
rived  from  ( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 0 0
0
i l l s j
As A A As c x c c x c x d c x d g = × + × £ × - = -   and  is  given  by 
0
0 ( )/( ) ³ × + × -
s l s l
A A A x c d c c c g . If the large audit firm  i effectively competes with the small 
audit firm  j , audit firm  i wins the contracts with small clients if the distance exceeds this 
threshold. Due to the small clients’ mass of 1, the number of clients of the small audit firm  j  
can be calculated by subtracting these two thresholds: 
(25) 
( ) ( )
0 0 0
2 2 2 .
× + ×










If the joint supply of audit and non-audit services is prohibited, in the short run the number of 
clients of the small audit firm  j  would increase to  
(26) 
( ) ( )
0












i.e.,  ( )
2 2
0 2 1 / ( ) ( )   D = × × - × -  
j s l s l
A A A c c c c g  small clients shift from the large audit firm  i to 
the small rival  j . 
For some arbitrary small audit firm  j t -  at a distance larger than that of the small audit firm 
j  (see Figure 9), which effectively competes with the large audit firm i, one can generalize 
the  threshold  at  which  audit  firm  i’s  costs  exceed  audit  firm  j t - ’s  costs  by  solving 
( ) 0 = × + ×
i t l l t
As A c x c c x g   ( ) ³ × + -
s t
A c t m d x ( ) = + -
j t
As c t m d x : 
(27)  ( ) 0 .











If i and  j t -  effectively compete,  j t -  wins the consulting contracts with small clients and 
can charge a fee equal to audit firm i’s costs. Similarly, one can compute the general thres-
hold at which audit firm i’s costs for auditing small clients are smaller than the costs of some 
arbitrary  small  audit  firm  j t -   by  solving  ( ) 0 = × + ×
i t l l t
As A c x c c x g   ( ) £ × - -
s t
A c x t m d  
( )
0 = - -
j
As c x t m d : 
(28)  ( ) 0 .













Figure 9: Contracting region of audit firm j t -  with  1 t =  
 
The difference between these thresholds gives the number of small clients for an arbitrary 
small audit firm  j t -  that effectively competes with the nearest large audit firm i: 
(29)  ( )
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A prohibition on consulting would, in the short run, result in a number of clients given by 
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j t s l s l
A A A c c c c g  more clients for any arbitrary small audit 
firm  j t -  that effectively competes with the large audit firm  i. Thus, the increase in the 
number of clients due to a prohibition on consulting services is identical for each small audit 
firm. 
An arbitrary small audit firm  j t - ’s costs when consulting is not prohibited are given by  
(31) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2







j t t s t t s t
As Cs A A
l l
A s t t s l s
A A A A
s l
A A
C x t m d c x t m d t m d x c t m d x
t m d c c




+ = × - - × × - - + × + - × × + -
+ × + ×     = × - - + + - = + × ×         -




( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 0
2 2
2 3 0 0





j t t t l l t l l t l l t
As Cs A A A
l l l l s
A A s s A
A A
s l s l s l
A A A A A A
x x c c x c c x c c x
t m d c c t m d c c c
c c





    P = - × × + × + × + × - × + ×        
  + × + × + × + × ×   = × × = ×
  - - -  
Subtracting the costs from the revenues leads to a profit contribution of 
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A prohibition on consulting would lead to a similar result with  0
l c  instead of  0
l c g × , i.e.,  
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This result holds for small audit firms  j t -  that effectively only compete with the large audit 
firm  i. Dependent on the shifted positions of large and small audit firms as well as on the 
relative number of small and large firms, a similar result holds for the small client located at 
the margin between the two large audit firms i and  1 i - . 
Thus, it is clear that prohibiting consulting services in the short run leads to an increased 
number of clients for small audit firms and also to increased revenues. The large audit firms, 
in contrast, lose clients to their small competitors, and they additionally lose the revenues 
from consulting for large clients.
24 Because the small audit firms’ profit contributions depend 
on their position relative to their nearest largest competitor (i.e.,  / 0
j t
As t p
- ¶ ¶ > ), we cannot 
use the zero-profit constraint to calculate a new specific market equilibrium. However, taking 
into account the increased profit contributions of the small audit firms and the decline in large 
audit firms’ profit contributions (which are also dependent on the ratio between the profit con-
tribution from consulting and the profit contribution from auditing), we predict that in the 
long run, more small and fewer large audit firms will be active in the market for auditing 
small clients. This development leads to higher average audit fees for large clients. Even though there are more small audit firms, the audit fees of small clients will also increase, be-
cause the large audit firms’ costs increase and thus small suppliers can charge higher fees.  
 
 
4  Conclusion 
 
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the European Commission is seeking to improve 
the independence and reliability of audit firms in order to contribute to the stabilization of the 
financial system. In its recently published Green Paper, the European Commission suggests a 
two-pillar policy: First, the Commission points to the need to further increase auditor inde-
pendence, and proposes a prohibition on the provision of non-audit services to audit clients as 
one possible way of achieving this goal. Simultaneously, the Commission is concerned about 
the high level of supplier concentration in most of the national audit markets within the Euro-
pean Union, and thus suggests methods of increasing the market position of second-tier audit 
firms. In the present paper, we show that the prohibition of the joint supply of audit and non-
audit services might have adverse effects on audit market concentration. This interrelation 
between these two focal issues on the Commission’s agenda was not addressed in the Green 
Paper. 
Our findings are based on a circular market matching model in the tradition of Salop 1979. 
We first investigated separate markets in which only large generalist audit firms or small spe-
cialized audit firms were active. In this scenario, our model predicted that the prohibition on 
supplying audit clients with non-audit services would decrease the number of large audit firms 
active in the market. The reasoning behind our findings is that a prohibition of the joint supply 
of audit and non-audit services increases audit costs. Given a certain amount of fixed costs, 
the reduced profit contribution large audit firms can earn in a pure audit market decreases the 
optimal number of suppliers. Since the number of corporations to be audited is constant, and 
we preclude competition between large and small audit firms, a decrease in the number of 
generalists is in line with an increase in audit market concentration.  
Second, we investigated a market setting in which small and large audit firms competed to 
audit small clients. Given certain cost parameters, a prohibition of non-audit services could 
lead to a segmentation of the audit market, i.e., to the elimination of competition between 
large and small audit firms for small clients. This effect occurs if the knowledge spillovers 
from consulting are very high. If competition between large and small suppliers for small 
clients is still existent even after the prohibition, our model predicts that a prohibition of non-
audit services would create a relatively disadvantageous situation for large audit firms. Thus, 
the small audit firms’ number of audit clients would increase, whereas the large audit firms 
would lose audit clients as well as profitable consulting contracts. Consequently, the number 
of large audit firms would decrease, while the number of small audit firms as well as their 
revenues would increase.  
Our results indicate that the prohibition on supplying non-audit services to audit clients has 
secondary effects on the structure of the audit market. Thus, auditor independence and market 
concentration cannot be treated separately. However, whether the prohibition of non-audit 
services increases or decreases market concentration depends on the cost structures of small 
and large audit firms as well as on the degree of competition for small audit clients. Further 
detailed empirical studies of the national audit markets are necessary in order to provide sup-
port for arguments for or against the joint provision of audit and non-audit services. 
 
   Remarks 
 
 
                                                 
1   See Ewert 1990, p. 197ff., Dopuch 1988, and Graham 1988 for a critique.  
2   See, for example, General Accounting Office 2008 for the US, Ewert/London Economics 2006 for Europe, 
and Stefani 2006, Bigus/Zimmermann 2008, Petersen/Zwirner 2008, Köhler et al. 2010, and Quick/Sattler 
2011b for Germany.  
3   We derive the conditions that must be fulfilled for the assumption  > m n  to emerge endogenously below. 
4   Our results from analyzing fee data from Switzerland and the USA show that clients of the (three and four) 
respective market leaders indeed demanded considerably more non-audit services than clients of the small 
audit firms. For the years 2002 to 2009, we observed an average ratio between non-audit fees and audit fees 
in Switzerland and in the USA of 30.57% and 21.67% for clients of non-Big X audit firms, whereas this ratio 
was 67.84% and 35.55% for clients of Big X auditors. 
5   The question of whether competition in the consulting market affects competition in the market for audit 
services is not the focus of this paper (for a formal analysis of this argument, see Wu 2006). 
6   The large audit firms’ higher number of partners and assistants also contributes to the increased costs asso-
ciated with acquiring and retaining audit staff and the higher expenses incurred for professional training. 
Chang et al. 2008 found empirical evidence that the number of training hours of partners and assistants is 
higher in big firms compared to middle-sized and small audit firms. 
7  Based on data for US audits performed by an international public accounting firm, O'Keefe et al. 1994 found 
that client characteristics explain more than 80% of the cross-sectional variation in the quantity of profes-
sional labor input. Measures for the client characteristics used in this study (client size, complexity, and risk) 
were similar to those used in prior audit pricing studies. Fee studies also indicate that the characteristics of 
the client and the auditor-client relationship account for a large degree of the variance in audit fees (for a me-
ta-analysis of the audit fee studies, see Hay et al. 2006). 
8   The results we obtain would be qualitatively similar if we assumed a concave or a convex cost function. 
9   Not only do small accounting firms face severe challenges in obtaining audit contracts from large clients, but 
it also seems that they are not very interested in serving this market segment (see General Accounting Office 
2008). In addition, there is empirical evidence that the choice of the auditor depends on client characteristics 
(see Knechel et al. 2008). 
10  See Simunic 1984, Simon 1985, DeBerg et al. 1991, and Bell et al. 2001 (US); Butterworth/Houghton 1995 
and Craswell/Francis 1999 (Australia); and Ezzamel et al. 1996 (UK). Palmrose 1986, however, documented 
a positive relationship between audit fees charged by one supplier and non-audit fees paid to a different sup-
plier that did not perform the audit, which contradicts the argument for knowledge spillovers. 
11  Using data on audit staff hours, O'Keefe et al. 1994 did not find evidence of knowledge spillovers from man-
agement consulting and/or tax consulting to audit services. Davis et al. 1993 found a weakly significant posi-
tive relationship between tax services and different audit effort measures and between accounting-related 
consulting services and audit hours weighted by billing-rate ratios. If additional effort is required for audits of 
clients who also purchase non-audit services and the demand for auditing is inelastic (see Beck et al. 1988, p. 
52-54), these results do not support the existence of audit production efficiencies arising from knowledge 
spillovers. 
12  Antle et al. 2006 also have used a simultaneous-equations specification to estimate audit and non-audit fee 
models, finding evidence consistent with the existence of knowledge spillovers. Their result thus stands in 
opposition to the findings of Whisenant et al. 2003. Their fee models, however, might be mis-specified, since 
important variables measuring audit effort are not included. 
13  Moreover, they showed that the significant coefficient of audit fees in a single-equation model with non-audit 
fees as a dependent variable (as documented in DeBerg et al. 1991, Barkess/Simnett 1994, and Craswell 
1999) is also sensitive to simultaneous-equations bias. 
14  In fact, numbers of audit firms between 
* / 2 m  and 
* m  would also be possible equilibria if we considered a 
sequential market entry decision. Since we do not focus on the auditors’ specialization decision, in the fol-
lowing sections we only consider the number of audit firms for which the zero-profit condition is fulfilled.  
15  Anecdotal evidence suggests that the profession is seriously affected by decreasing hourly rates for auditing, 
which is seen as a springboard for attracting clients to buy higher-margin non-audit services (see, for exam-
ple, Göggelmann 2010). The reasoning for “dumping pricing” is related to the overcapacities of audit firms 
(see o.V. 2009). There is, however, also evidence indicating that the decrease in revenues from non-audit 
services caused by the implementation of regulatory restrictions is being offset by a substantial increase in 
audit fees and in higher profit margins for audit services (see Weil 2004, Weil 2005, and Gullapalli 2005).                                                                                                                                                          
16  Based on an empirical study, Quick/Sattler 2011b make a similar argument regarding the interrelation be-
tween restricting the fee an audit firm is allowed to earn from a single audit client to a certain percentage (al-
so viewed as a possible means to increase auditor independence) and the level of audit market concentration. 
17  Khurana/Raman 2006 and Quick/Warming-Rasmussen 2009, for example, document the fact that addressees 
of financial reports perceive auditor independence to be impaired if auditing and consulting services are ac-
quired from the same supplier, and Frankel et al. 2002 report a positive relationship between non-audit fees 
and the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Larcker/Richardson 2004 and Lim/Tan 2008, in contrast, ob-
serve that audit quality increases with the level of non-audit services, and Jenkins/Krawczyk 2001 find a fa-
vorable effect on perceived auditor independence in appearance (or no effect). Quick/Sattler 2011a demon-
strate that attestation services and tax consulting services do not significantly affect earnings management, 
whereas consulting services from the category “miscellaneous“ impair the quality of financial statements. 
18  The qualitative results of our analysis do not change if audit firm i audits clients it is specialized in and pro-
vides consulting services to clients outside this region: The profit contribution from consulting would not 
change, but the average consulting fees would increase by  2 C c n .Which of these cases is more costly for the 
clients depends on the relation between  ×
l
A c a  and  C c . 
19  From fiscal years 2002 to 2009, the three largest audit firms (KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & 
Young) audited on average 86% of listed corporations headquartered in Switzerland (not including financial 
institutions and real estate or insurance companies; data from Thomson One, Audit Analytics, and from an-
nual reports). Thus, the Swiss audit market can serve as an example of a separated audit market. 
20  Between 2002 and 2009, the largest four audit firms in the USA (KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & 
Young, and Deloitte) provided audit services to only 56% of the listed companies headquartered in the USA, 
on average (data from Thomson One, Audit Analytics, and from annual reports). Thus, small audit firms had a 
non-negligible market share even in the market for listed companies, at least if the number of clients is used 
as a measure of calculating the concentration ratio. 
21  This result, however, is straightforward, since we did not assume that audit firms incur additional fixed costs 
for providing consulting services to their clients. 
22  For the case in which consulting also affects the costs for auditing small clients that are similar to the large 
clients  consuming  consulting  services,  our  results  are  unaffected  if  the  more  restrictive  restriction 
0 2
l s s
A F c c c g × > × ×  is fulfilled.  
23  If the assumption does not hold because the number of large audit firms  n  is sufficiently high and  0
l c  is 
sufficiently low, the large audit firm i  effectively competes with the nearest other large audit firm  1 i -  and 
could charge a fee of  ( ) 0 0
i l l
A fee c c n = + .  
24  A similar result holds for the case in which not all small audit firms in between two large audit firms effec-
tively compete with the large audit firms. If small audit firms in a relatively large distance to the nearest large 
audit firm compete with each other, these small audit firms can be investigated as in Reference Situation I. 
The analysis of the audit firms relatively near to the large audit firms’ positions is the same as described in 
this section. 





Figure 1: Audit firms and clients on the unit circle 
 





Figure 2: Characteristic-dependent costs for auditing a small client at location x 
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Figure 4: Small audit firms’ revenues from providing audit services 
    
Figure 5: Small audit firms’ profit contribution earned from providing audit services 
    
Figure 6: Large audit firms’ profit contribution earned from providing audit and 
consulting services to various clients 
   
















Figure 7: Cost structures of small and large audit firms if a prohibition on providing 
consulting services leads to separation of the audit markets 
    
Figure 8: Cost structures of small and large audit firms 
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